Convergence Model of Governance: A Case Study of the Local Government System of Pakistan by Shah, Syed Akhter Hussain et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Convergence Model of Governance: A
Case Study of the Local Government
System of Pakistan
Syed Akhter Hussain Shah and Mahmood Khalid and Tariq
Shah
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics Islamabad Pakistan
2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8690/
MPRA Paper No. 8690, posted 9. May 2008 13:09 UTC
The Pakistan Development Review 
45 : 4 Part II (Winter 2006) pp. 855–871 
 
 
 
Convergence Model of Governance: A Case Study of 
the Local Government System of Pakistan 
 
SYED AKHTER HUSSAIN SHAH, MAHMOOD KHALID, and TARIQ SHAH* 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The future of devolution plan in Pakistan may be analysed in view of our 
Convergence model. This model views stability of the local Govt. system drawn on 
Devolution Plan 2001. It claims that as there would be more volatile and non-committed 
(floating) number of agents in the political market and governance system, there is more 
probability of divergence; i.e. the system will remain unstable. Contrary to that more is 
the systematic trend in political market and governance system more is the probability 
that the convergence in the system occurs and that in turn leads to stability of the over all 
system. In this ‘Convergence’ Model different types of agents have been highlighted on 
the basis of their political affiliation and being in competition as ruling elite and/or their 
allies and non-ruling elite and/or their allies.  
The agents have interactive relationship horizontally and vertically with other 
agents i.e. either they are ally or otherwise. The composition of this structure of the 
agents and clients is based on the principle of bottom top approach i.e. Union council’s 
members, Nazim and their political competitors, Tehsil council and Nazim, District 
Nazim and his allied district assembly members and their political competitors, Member 
provincial Assembly and their political rivals, Member National Assembly/Senator, and 
their political rival and the ruling political elites, Provincial Government and their 
political rivals, and Political elites ruling Federal Government and their political rivals. 
 
2. LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 
The devolution of administrative and fiscal power from the national and provincial 
level to local governments (LGs), viz. District government (DGs), Tehsil/town municipal 
administrations (TMAs), and union administration (UAs), that began in 2001, is designed 
to help correct the problem of inadequate rival and non-rival goods delivery by making 
the public sector more accountable to citizens and more efficient at delivering basic 
services. Local Government Ordinance 2001 [LGO (2001)] defines responsibilities for 
service delivery and fiscal and political oversight at the DG, TMA and UA levels. 
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3. THE HISTORY OF THE DEVOLUTION OF POWER THROUGH  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN 
Devolution of power has been carried out in Pakistan in earlier decades as well by 
respective rulers in different times. These were: 
 (a) Ayub’s BD (basic Democracy) system of devolution of power.  
 (b) Zia’s BD system of devolution of power. 
These devolution systems were to serve short run needs in order to get their support in 
(1) diffusing public reaction/sense of deprivation against the respective regime (2) Hedge 
against criticism of international democratic élites (3) To legitimise their actions of nullifying 
the previously existing political system (4) The system was backed by military. 
These two types of basic democracies were short run in objectives and structure 
therefore ceased with the end of respective ruler due to the following reasons:  
 (1) Structural instability due to divergent endogenous variables of the political 
system such as antagonistic role of MNAs and MPAs. 
 (2) Withdrawal of strength and reinforcement of exogenous variables for stability 
of the political governance system.  
Commonalities and difference in previous and present system of governance are 
given below: 
 
Table 1 
Comparison of Governance Systems 
Similarities Differences 
1. Introduction of new political 
system is backed by Military 
regime. 
2. Defusing reaction  
3. Partial Hedging against the critics. 
4. Legitimisation of change in political 
governance system.  
1. Earlier only one type of system of basic 
democracies (BDs) existed as a substitute 
of national assemblies (NA), and provincial 
assemblies (PA),  but now its more 
complicated and heterogeneous and there 
are parallel tiers of NA, PA and district 
governments with formal and informal, 
independent and overlapping functions, 
domain and constituencies  with clashing 
objectives. 
2. It has multifarious functions 
(i) Administration 
(ii) Law and order  
(iii) Fiscal and Legislative  
(iv) Execution  
3. Structural difference and change to 
perpetual skeleton is framed in thirteen (13) 
district departments with elimination of 
office of Assistant commissioner deputy 
commissioner and commissioner etc. 
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4.  STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF LG SYSTEM AND ITS 
INTEGRATING PARTNERS IN THE  
CONVERGENCE MODEL 
This system comprises principal/agent (Nazims and governance system) to 
supervise/deliver the rival and non-rival goods for ensuring service delivery to clients 
(general public). Here the agents X (Union council (UC) nazims and members, Tehsil 
(TMA) nazim and members of tehsil council (TC) and District nazim and district council 
(DC)) and agent Y (executing machinery/line departments and other establishment 
personal) with endogenous variables like stake holders in the district etc. Convergence in 
the public sector may be achieved by setting and achieving common goals. 
 
 
Public 
MNA 
Defeated MNA 
MPA 
Defeated MPA 
Nazims 
Ruling Opposition 
Ruling Opposition 
 
Convergence may be defined as a point in a governance system at which interests 
of all the integrating partners of system that is principal, agent and clients converge. That 
may be welfare optimum point for stake holders in a system. In this particular case it is 
efficient and equitable public goods/service delivery to clients (general public) for 
increasing their welfare.  
 In order to proceed we may start our analysis by taking into account different 
aspects of principals, agents and clients in the system.  
 
4.1.  Appointment of Agents Y 
These agents are members of executing machinery and are placed against high 
responsibility, demanding and professional posts. Appointment on these posts can or 
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should only be made from amongst highly qualified persons with experience in financial 
management, planning and development and administrative exposure, which is only 
available at this, much low cost from the government departments. Alternatively, persons 
of same calibre are available in the private sectors for appointment on such posts would 
cost approximately above 60,000 Rupees per month which is further subject to location, 
political stability and environment of the district. Then the only economical and cost 
effective strategy is to appoint officers from the civil service which may cost at most 
15,000 to 20,000 Rupees per month.  
One of such appointee is the district coordination officer (DCO), who is supposed 
to head the district secretariat and perform a number of functions stipulated in different 
laws/rules/regulations. His immediate performance is judged and reported upon by the 
district Nazim. DCO is thus obliged to keep district nazim in good humour and if district 
nazim is from the ruling party, the very survival of DCO is dependent upon the continued 
support of district nazim. Similarly for the purpose of maintenance of law and order 
District police officer (DPO) has to report to district nazim. These two factors immensely 
enhance the clout, power and authority of district nazim. Thus he can influence 
bureaucratic machinery to his advantage.  
Postings/transfers of members of district cadres is an important source of 
mustering and exercising political influence. Many developmental works are carried out 
within the district by the Executive District officers (EDOs)  with the concurrence of 
DCO. DCO has to keep in mind the recommendations of district nazim, MNA/MPAs 
while agreeing to the proposal. His sailing is likely to be smooth where district Nazim 
and MNA/MPAs are from the same political party; otherwise reconciliation of conflicting 
interests would become a real source of trouble for DCO. 
Award of all contracts of public capital formation at the district level are keenly 
controlled despite the fact that government has evolved procedures that help ensure that 
contracts are awarded on merit but still room is always there for favouring a contestant. 
These aspirants for contracts are mostly influential people who can help fetch votes in the 
next elections. Further award of contracts also help create more job opportunities, as 
more people would be required to complete a new project. This situation can create 
tension and friction in the system if power holders are from different political parties and 
thus weaken the system.  
 
4.2.  Appointment of Agents X 
Agents X are appointed by through election in two different steps and methods; (1) 
members (agents) of district and union councils are elected through public elections (2) 
Nazims (principal) of district elected through electoral college comprising members of 
district councils, union councils and other councillors etc. through apparently non party 
based election.  
The system is essentially political in nature, though for reasons unexplained the 
government has been trying to keep it apolitical. The known political parties have 
actively participated in the political process of election for district government 
institutions at all levels under different names. This apparent apolitical policy gives rise 
to increasing numbers of non committed agents.  
A Case Study of the Local Government System of Pakistan 859
The elections of district government in 2001 were held in the scenario when there 
was complete political vacuum. The elections to national and provincial assemblies of 
2002 created different environment in which district governments were to operate. There 
were instances of friction especially where a district Nazim headed the district 
government hailing from a party opposite to the party in power at the provincial level. 
However, district governments headed by a Nazim belonging to the party in power at the 
provincial level had different impact on convergence of the system. The position is 
illustrated from the  Table 2. 
Every politician irrespective of whether he/she is aspiring for any elected body 
needs popular votes to be elected. This is done by having more and close interaction with 
the voters and mobilising their opinion in his/her favour by highlighting certain 
issues/problems. This may be a point of divergence as well as convergence keeping in 
view the fact that the issue/problem in question may be looked at from divergent 
viewpoints. The strategy of an aspirant would play a definite role as to how he convinces 
the voters that certain of his promises would increase the welfare level of voters, enhance 
their material well being and social status, as well as provide them opportunities for more 
economic gains.  
It has been observed that such change has been noted in the priority and approach 
of the electorates. In certain constituencies voters have made casting of their votes 
contingent upon resolution of their collective needs. In certain cases they have insisted 
upon guarantees from candidates for resolution of their problem before exercising their 
right to vote in their favour.  
District Nazim’s have the opportunity to strengthen their political position to get 
elected some of their nominees to different monitoring by exercising their clout with 
other members of the district council.  
 
4.3.  Factors Making Agents ‘X’ Commit or Change Loyalties  
An agent is assumed to be rational when he decides his strategy in view of his 
expected gains and costs in period one and period two ( or in general upto n periods). He 
also plans how he can achieve maximum votes in future along with other political and 
economic interests by optimising his utility simultaneously in different periods. These 
include: 
I. Political Interests 
(i) More interaction with people.  
(ii) Appease voters. 
(iii) Increase their welfare level by obliging themselves by;  
(a) increase their social status in merit goods through their role and  
personal recommendation and  recognition  
(b) Economic gains  
(c) Public capital share  
(d) Power share through participation in different committees such as; 
1. Public safety  
2. Accountability  
3. Project committees 
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Table 2 
Convergence in Pakistani Political System 
Political Market 
Principle/Agent 
at the Local 
Government Agents  System 
Partisan group (Committed) 
Elected and non elected allies 
at horizontal and vertical level 
Convergence 
Nazim 
Non committed 
Elected and non-elected 
members at district level 
Divergence,  if have direct access to Zila Nazim or Zila Nazim 
is elected under a political party's flag then workers/partisans of 
that party may support agents 
 
 
 
Politicians in Local Government Set-up. 
(Here we assume it’s the district 
government/politicians involved in district politics 
including ruling or otherwise)  
District 
opposition 
(Non-
committed) 
Partisan with 
Provincial/federal government, 
by-passing Local Government Divergence 
Partisan with local 
government  Convergence Partisan  group to MPAs Opposition  Divergence 
Partisan to the local 
government 
May convergence or diverge; depending upon MPAs power 
drawn from provincial government and relations with local 
government 
Politicians 
at  
Provincial 
Level 
MPAs;  
they draw/exercise provincial 
government powers in local 
government jurisdiction for securing 
their vote bank 
Opposition  
group to MPAs Opposition  to the local 
government diverge 
Partisan with local 
government  Convergence Partisan  group 
to MNAs 
Opposition  Divergence 
Partisan to the local 
government 
May convergence or diverge; depending upon MNAs power 
drawn from provincial government and relations with local 
government 
 MNAs 
Opposition  
group to MNAs 
Opposition  to the local 
government diverge 
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4. CCB (Community Citizen Board) 
5. Monitoring etc. 
(iv) Role in election in order to have expansion in political/interest groups  
(v) Time preference model to be affective so as to prepare group fellow or allies to 
be successful in time period two (Term period 2, TP2). 
(vi) Influence/recognition over bureaucrat machinery.  
(vii) Influence and recognition over political elites for posting/transfer and share in 
developmental works. 
II. Economic Interests  
1. Contracts of public capital.  
2. New emerging economic opportunities are grasped, Mega project and 
industrialisations as a byproduct of Government policies pertaining to 
economic development e.g. in Bolachistan Gwadar Port scheme, Schemes 
in Lahore, New Muree Development projects and other projects including 
those which need land acquisition.  
3. Employment opportunities for prospective voters whether new job is 
created or for already existing jobs. 
4. Leverage in playing due to own revenues. 
As already there is incompatibility between opportunities and choices, with its 
competing people existing in the political market makes an agent to compare and 
evaluate his gains and costs in the dynamic manner, so he performs role and duties in 
current and future time periods and set his behaviour for establishment of his credibility 
and political alliances/links with other power elites accordingly. 
If a politician is losing something which was in his possession or in a simpler case 
of no gain no loss game, by losing the game he suffers the loss of opportunity cost of his 
resources coupled with investment made at the time of election and credibility of next 
election win.  
One time or two time loss in game may or may not adversely affect a local 
politician but series of loss will adversely affect his performance, objectives and 
future designs and probability to stay in the game of politics. Whether he stops 
himself in political arena or completely knocked out by competitors. As the general 
public (local voters) expect performance of their local representative in very petty 
administrative and developmental or economic matters. If he continuously remains 
in opposition and is not capable to promote their interests he may lose a large 
number of his voters. He calculates his cost and benefits; both pull and push factors 
and then decides whether to stay in opposition or join ruling party, therefore, his 
role may be divergent if he stays in opposition and convergent if he joins ruling 
party (group). 
Similar, analysis of rest of the integrating partners may be carried out one by one. 
Change of their loyalties to the ruling district government/group or staying in the 
opposition depends on both cost (direct and opportunity cost) and benefits (current and 
future). 
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4.4. Factors Making Agents ‘Y’ Promise Efficient Delivery 
The Agent ‘Y’ would also make their decisions based on his dynamic utility 
maximisation, in which he not only considers his short term welfare targets i.e. financial 
returns, social networking, career growth etc but also in their long run goal perspective is 
incorporated in the decision making. From the geographical perspective i.e. in the remote 
districts the officers are unwilling to serve due to their opportunity constraints such as: 
 (i) Financial losses. 
 (ii) Power gain or loss.   
 (iii) Transportation cost. e.g. shifting form HQ to any remote district as there is a 
big gap between the TA DA rates which were fixed dozens of year earlier. 
This causes additional psychological and financial burden on the official.   
 (iv) Lack of HR deployment especially in rural and remote districts. E.g. temporary 
posting, i.e. out of 24 districts less than 50 percent have appropriate HR 
deployment especially in rural and remote districts junior officers are posted 
against senior posts. In other words more responsible and high level of efficiency 
is expected from persons of lower grade despite the fact most of them legally 
qualify for the posts being held by them. Due to lack of their formal/actual up-
gradation (promotion) to their respective grades they feel they are not properly 
appreciated. This fact could be highlighted from the following Table 3 as well; 
 
Table 3 
Staff Strength at Tehsil Level 
Heads/Province Punjab Sindh NWFP 
TMOs    
  Vacant CH KD  
  Actual & Existing Same SG MK, DG, ML TM, SB 
  Actual Grade AE (18) KP (18), BD (18)  
  Existing Grade AE (17) KP (17), BaN (16)  
TOFs    
  Vacant  MK  
  Actual & Existing Same SG, AE DG  
  Actual Grade SL (17) BIN (16), ML (17) TM (17), SB (17) 
  Existing Grade SL (16) BD  (11), ML (11) TM (16), SB (11) 
TOPs    
  Vacant CH KD, MK, DG, ML TM, SB 
  Actual & Existing Same Sg TG   
  Actual Grade AE (17)   
  Existing Grade AE (16)   
TO(I&S)    
  Vacant  BD  
  Actual & Existing Same SG, TG MK, DG, ML TM, SB 
  Actual Grade AE(17)   
  Existing Grade AE (16)   
TORs    
  Vacant CHK   
  Actual & Existing Same SG, TG MK, DG, ML TM 
  Actual Grade SL (17), AE (17) BD (17) SB (17) 
  Existing Grade SL (16), AE (11) BDN (16) SB (11) 
Source: This Data was taken from work funded as part of the World Bank “Rural Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Study”, 2006. 
SG = Sargodha SL = Silanwali CH = Chakwal TG = Talagang BH = Bahawalpur  
AE = Ahmedpur East KP = Khairpur  KD = Kot Digi MK = Mirpurkhass DG = Dighri  
BD = Badin  ML = Matli TM = Temergara SB = Samarbagh 
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As it can be seen from the above Table;  
 (1) Certain roles are not filled at all, e.g. Tehsil Chakwal and Kot Digi does 
not have TMOs (Tehsil Municipal Officer). 
 (2) Some roles are not considered to be important for any posting/transfer, e.g. 
the role of Tehsil Officer planning (TOP), which is responsible for spatial 
planning and other issues of resource management. 
 (3) Those Tehsils which have postings with required grades (which is 
supposed to carry required level of capacity for the job) against positions 
would lead to efficient delivery of rival and non-rival goods. 
 (v) If we see it from the convergence point then the following can be asserted; 
 
Table 4 
Convergence Through Institutions 
Convergent Their response may be convergent at the stages of planning and implementation. 
Executing 
machinery 
(agent  Y) Divergent 
 Under this system their cost of living increases while decreased incentives, such 
as transport, residence etc. further their power decreases as well, as theoretically 
their responsibility shifts to Nazims but practically they use them to achieve 
their interests under the garb of official practices/procedures in remote, 
unattractive district where they are least interested or indifferent. 
 
5. THEORY AND MODEL 
Success story of this devolution plan presumably is laid on the fact that the plan is 
mainly to pursue welfare objectives grasping welfare opportunities. A man also counts 
his own welfare level while making decisions of performance in this system what he lose 
and what he gains? If he is losing something which was in his possession rather its no 
gain no loss game, however, by losing this game he suffers the loss of opportunity cost 
coupled with investment made at the time of election.  
The convergence of endogenous variables leads toward long run sustainability of the 
system and its further stabilised and perpetuated with a coherently exogenous variables, 
contrarily disharmonised or divergent exogenous variable may unstable the system in a 
slow or radical manner depending on the strength of converging variables and degree of 
divergence of exogenous variables. Similarly, cordon of diverging endogenous variables by 
a strong exogenous variable only shows a short run and pseudo stability of the system. 
More a system is endogenously convergent more it will be stable in the long run.  
Convergence and divergence of endogamous and exogenous variables 
(integrating) partners of the power system will determine its sustainability. The above 
discussion shows that in case of Local Government’s case federal government seems the 
only integrating partner, whose behaviour is completely convergent due to the obvious 
reasons that this devolution plan is her brain child, similarly this plan nurtures at the 
playground of provincial government whose powers were snatched and delegated to the 
district government. Similarly, if there are meagre financial revenue generation systems 
are given by the federal government to the district government, and more are federal or 
provincial transfers then federation is using administrative powers to make its baby 
successful then that may not be a convergent factor. The same is evident by Table 5.  
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Table 5 
Funds Transferred to Local Governments (Punjab, Sindh, and the NWFP) 
(Mill.Rs) 
RE RE RE  2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Punjab     
  District Governments 43,043.6 50,858.7 53,794.6 54,785.0 
  Tehsil/Town Municipal Administrations 3,765.2 7,119.4 4,670.8 4,884.3 
  Union Administrations 2,410.8 2,702.0 2,702.2 2,712.7 
Total 49,219.6 60,680.1 61,167.6 62,382.0 
NWFP     
  Development  963.0 963.0 973.0 
  OZT tax share  984.0 887.0 926.0 
Total  16,900.0 16,858.0 19,173.0 
Sindh     
  OZT grants  6,600.0 6,029.1 11,496.3 
  Development   2,728.1 6,789.6 
  DSSDP    1,889.0 
Total  29,885.8 30,675.5 55,204.5 
Total 3 Provinces  107,466 108,701 136,759 
Source: Finance Departments GoPunjab, GoNWFP and GoSindh  
Punjab 2002-03 BE. 
Sindh 2004-05 is BE, 2005-06 Recurring slit on 2004-05 basis, 
PHE transfers, DSSP and ESR same as last year. 
Note:   This Data was taken from work funded as part of the World Bank  “Rural Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Study”, 2006. 
 
The above table shows that there are huge transfers to the local governments, 
which are mainly used to finance for the developmental budget. More over their own 
revenue is not even enough to cover for their recurring expenses, as evident from the 
following Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
Sampled District Government Own Revenues (2005-06) 
Districts/ Heads 
Total Budget 
(Rupees in Millions)
Own Revenues 
(Rupees in Millions)
Own Revenue 
(% Total Budget) 
Sargodha 3,028 121 4.0 
Chakwal 2,513 24 1.0 
Bahawalpur 3,088 502 16.3 
Khairpur 3,325 269 8.1 
Mirpurkhas 1,923 247 12.8 
Badin 2,030 115 5.7 
Dir Lower 917 0 0.0 
Source:  District Governments Budgets. 
Note:  This Data was taken from work funded as part of the World Bank  “Rural Growth and Poverty Reduction 
Study”, 2006. 
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Table 7 
Sampled Tehsil Municipal Administrations Own Revenues  
TMAs 
 
Year 
Budget  
(Millions) Own revenue (%) 
03-04 283.1 37.4 
04-05 277.7 41.9 
Sargodha 
05-06 308.0 55.8 
03-04 – – 
04-05 – – 
Silanwali 
05-06 37.5 15.2 
03-04 98.9 59.6 
04-05 243.1 63.8 
Chakwal 
05-06 220.8 44.1 
03-04 211.6 22.4 
04-05 109.2 73.4 
Talagang 
05-06 131.0 72.4 
03-04 131.2 38.3 
04-05 214.0 41.2 
Bahawalpur 
05-06 277.3 44.7 
03-04 67.4 47.8 
04-05 124.6 50.7 
Ahmedpur East 
05-06 91.0 31.9 
03-04 69.9 11.7 
04-05 – – 
Khairpur 
05-06 101.0 35.6 
03-04 – – 
04-05 35.5 11.5 
Kot Digi 
05-06 62.4 10.4 
03-04 62.5 27.7 
04-05 76.6 13.5 
Mirpur Khas 
05-06 160.0 21.3 
03-04 56.7 29.4 
04-05 56.6 26.2 
Digri 
05-06 140.0 24.3 
03-04 – – 
04-05 37.3 14.9 
Badin 
05-06 56.0 35.0 
03-04 14.5 23.3 
04-05 39.6 25.1 
Matli 
05-06 45.6 22.8 
03-04 22.7 88.2 
04-05 28.2 60.3 
Timergarah 
05-06 30.0 63.3 
03-04 4.0 87.8 
04-05 17.7 70.8 
Samarbagh 
05-06 10.7 55.9 
Source:  This Data was taken from work funded as part of the World Bank “Rural Growth and Poverty 
Reduction Study”, 2006.  
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The above tables show that there are huge fiscal budgets both at tehsil and district 
levels. But the own revenue financing of budgets are very low at district level and some 
what better at tehsil level. Only Bahawalpur among the sampled district had a share of 
16.3 percent portion of budget is financed by own revenue in 2005-06, and lowest of 
Chakwal i.e. only 1 percent. Now this shows that the gap needs to be bridged from the 
financing by either the federal or the provincial government. Now as per assignment there 
are transfers from these as well, but to increase availability of funds for development and 
recurring expenses the nazims have to use the channels as explained in the table. 
 
5.1.  Model 
Now the four integrating partners (Governments), the district level politicians have 
mixed response, partisan ruling party may have convergence while opposition members 
have divergence. In the paper we would also use the notion of Political convergence in 
analysis. 
Similarly overlapping interests, functions etc of all the integrating partners 
including agents, principal and clients may be analysed on the following lines: 
 (1) Economic perspective.  
 (2) Political perspective.  
 (3) Social perspective.  
 (4) Legislation.  
 (5) Fiscal transfer of power to MPAs.  
The role of exogenous variables can be seen from the angle of; 
 (a) Publicity.  
 (b) Share of power in politics, execution and law and order.  
 (c) Fiscal share with  not a good start. 
 (d) Capacity building.  
The analysis is carried out by using the above defined types of agents of the game;  
i.e. X and Y. ‘X’ types of agents have dual role/nature that is they may act as principal (of Y) 
at one time in a particular situation and may act as agent (to the public) at the same time in 
another situation as well which reconciles with agency theory by Fama and Jensen (1983). 
Other type of agents ‘Y’ is only to deliver public goods and services etc to clients.  
There are three broad types of opportunity sets for these agents;1. ‘U’ universal set 
of opportunity bundle available at the expense of public funds and it is open to all the 
agents of type ‘X’ and ‘Y’ to be dealt out to clients (beneficiaries). 2. Second type of 
opportunity set is ‘N’ a sub set of ‘U’, which comprises elements of public goods of non-
rival nature and may be shared by agents of all type. 3. Third, type of opportunity set is 
‘R’ which is also a sub set of ‘U’; comprises elements of rival goods such as obtaining 
contracts, employment opportunities, power of posting transfer etc which becomes 
exclusive to some agents. Elements of both the sets ‘N’ and ‘R’ does not exhaust set ‘U’, 
i.e. set ‘U’ may also contain elements other than the elements of ‘N’ and ‘R’ as other 
floating and prospective opportunities are also possible in these types of opportunities. If 
the competition is more tough then even the agent having arbitrary powers may push out 
the competitors from the market/competition.  
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The model of local government system (from devolution plan) can be defined as: 
Universal set:  U:{C1 ------Cn} 
Opportunity sets: {Type 1 ––>  N (Non-rival, overlapping for its elements) 
 Type 2 ––> R (Rival, mutually exclusive) 
where  N:{a1-------am} 
 R: {b1-------be} 
The agents ‘X’ on behalf of beneficiaries (people) get power, then by obtaining 
opportunity set ‘N’ deliver these opportunity elements to the beneficiaries for getting his 
stronger vote bank for next confirmation of win. These elements may be shared with 
public and more than one agent. Agents of type ‘X’ can be further sub-divided in two 
types. One are the committed agents Xc which are affirm to their alliances principally 
based on common, political and socio-economic interests. While the second type of 
agents ‘Xn’ are the floating non-committed agents in the system who behave randomly 
and ultimately increase randomness in the system of governance leading toward 
divergence and then making local government system unstable as a whole. 
For the second opportunity set ‘R’ the agents grab the opportunity set exclusively 
independent of others, without sharing with other agents such as contracts, appointment 
of allies, posting transfer etc. As they are exclusive to some, therefore to grab the most of 
them the agents compete and apply their other influences and tactics. Every agent is a 
competitor in this regard making it an oligopoly model, where there are shares based on 
the market power (e.g. Cournot Model). As they are the competitor the agent who gets 
more powers individually or as a group gets more elements out of set ‘R’ and they 
exercise market power by applying rules of game. 
 Similarly, Agents of type two ‘Y’ are implementation agents which may deliver 
public goods and services drawn on the elements of Universal set ‘U’. 
{ }
{ }
{ }zk
ej
mi
bbN
aaR
R
N
RN
UUU
U
U
UU
...................
...................
...................
1
1
1
=
=
=
⊆
⊆
⊆
 
Where as; 
zK
lj
mi
−−−−−−=
−−−−−−−=
−−−−−−−=
,1
,1
1
 
These agents may deliver public goods and services close to potential level of 
elements of ‘U’ or less than that. More the elements Uk of set ‘U’ are delivered by agent 
directly or indirectly to clients (beneficiaries) the probability of convergence of the 
system increase which in turn leads to stability of the political governance system. More, 
willing and dynamic agents of type ‘Y’ may increase size and scope of public goods and 
services delivery, which ultimately benefits to their clients (general public). Similarly the 
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‘Y’ type agents are of two types in our model; one is YW willing agents and other is Yu 
unwilling agents. If a political system where agents of type YW are more it has more 
probability of convergence which in turn leads to sustainability of the local government 
system. Contrarily a governance system comprising more number of agents of type Yu 
will have more probability of divergence that in turn leads to un-sustainability of the local 
government system. The opportunity set for YW, Yu will be UW and Uu respectively with the 
condition for stability that wu UU p  for the society. So the size of the opportunity set also 
affect convergence of the governance system and stability of the local govt. system. So 
optimal strategy would be to have more of set Uw delivered through Yw for stability of the 
system. 
If we take the case where we may have U = N Ừ R. We assume that there is non-
linearity and total of the opportunity set U is consumed.  In both type of sets N and R 
comprising of non-rival and rival opportunity bundles, they can be further subdivided in 
two further types; committed and non-committed goods;  
N = ∧+ NN o  
∧+= RRR o  
So we can write U = ∧+ NN o + ∧+ RRo  
Where N^ and R^ are substitutable and the total budget utilisation is made in rival 
public goods.  With the increase in the number of Non-committed members more budget 
share is consumed in the Non-committed part of the rival goods set. 
U = U0 + U^ 
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Slope of the curves show substitutability of loyalties in lieu of demand for rival 
goods rather it’s the cost to be paid by the principal to attain loyalty out of the public 
exchequer (budget constraint). If there is such number of Xn that any of the principal 
either Federal government or the Provincial government may attempt to thwart existing 
district/tehsil/union council by producing rival goods. As the non-committed rival goods 
are substitute of non-committed non-rival goods. So if this process continues then in turn 
lesser allocation of resources (budget) on non-rival good is made. Non-rival goods 
mainly contribute to the welfare level enhancement of individuals, group or society. If 
there is an outcome from any system of governance that reduces welfare level of the 
society, that system will be less popular therefore individuals and society will not 
participate at their potential level and ultimately reject the system. This reduces stability 
of system due to divergent attitudes of principal, agents and client. If the principal makes 
rules of the game irrationally this gives more returns in the form of public goods to the 
principal and a group of non-committed agents at the cost of non-rival public goods to be 
utilised by the clients. This decreases the returns to the clients and bringing them at a 
lower utility indifference curve. 
As a rational consumer an individual always prefer more through local-non-
satiation. Therefore he will not stay at lower utility indifference curve and think of 
alternative strategy to change his cooperation with the existing local government system. 
Thus the system is rejected by more number of individuals and can not sustain itself or be 
viable for the long run. Therefore for a stable system of governance more member 
individuals in the society should cooperate with it in lieu of their production and 
distribution of public goods. As more are Xn number of agents more is the leverage for 
the principal to gain their loyalties in lieu of rival goods. It is the rent seeking behaviour 
of the principal from such rules of the game, therefore he can use such a situation more in 
his favor. In the local government system of governance the role of principal is 
performed by the Federal government in period I but in period II with amendment in LG 
ordinance it is also conditionally performed by the provincial government. Different 
amendments in the ordinance empowered provincial government; it can suspend any 
district government conditional.  
If both the principal; the Federal government and Provincial government have 
different interests and preferences then ultimately they will adopt different strategies to 
increase their   own payoffs at the cost of clients who then decide to adopt the   strategies 
which enable them to increase their payoffs. Similarly in period   II   no-confidence 
movement  against  nazims is  also allowed which will  pave ways  to increase  political 
manipulations to get hold over seats of power through the agents liked by the principal to 
replace the earlier agent elected by the clients. 
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Convergence mainly depends on number of Non-committed non-rival goods which 
is substitute of non-committed rival goods, so with the increase in R^ the N^ decreases 
and convergence for stability decreases. As Xn  increases, to gain their loyalties either to 
change/topple  the  government or to maintain the seat of power the non-committed 
agents increase their rent seeking and that is given from the budget (U) in the form of 
rival goods R^,  so general public and opposition has to lose their share N^ against their 
expectation and hence start reacting against this  system and make other alliances or 
initiate resistance so that there is change in political system and this process continues 
with increasing instability to the system. 
The convergence of endogenous variables leads to toward long run sustainability 
of the system and its further stabilise perpetuated growth with coherently exogenous 
variables, the disharmonised or divergent exogenous variable may unstable the system in 
a slow or radical manner depending on the strength of converging variables and degree of 
divergence of exogenous variables similarly, cordon of diverging endogenous variables 
by a strong exogenous variable only shows a short run and present stability of the system. 
More a system is endogenously convergent more it will be stable in the long run. 
Following factor may affect committed and non-committed agents when they make their 
decision: 
 (1) Incentives provided by the local district government (group). 
 (2) Role/trend of voters to join ruling group. 
 (3) Intensity of nature of opposition during election. 
 (4) Role of opponent (defeated) of the opposition member (i) either he belongs to 
ruling group or not (ii) whether he encourages/bars his joining opposition 
deliberately or otherwise. 
 (5) Role of local MPAs: may have the following dimensions: (i) whether they 
support the district government  
 (6) keep themselves neutral  
 (7) oppose them at provincial government level and at local political level  
 (8) Effectiveness of local MPA in power circle at, provincial government level, 
federal government level and district government level. 
As more are the non-committed members more is the probability to continue the 
game repeatedly and will take more time to converge.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
As stability of the system is function of opportunity bundles obtained by 
beneficiaries through agents Yw and Xc. The equilibrium level is lowest if Yw are lesser and 
Xn are more. The degree of sustainability can be described as follows: 
Let us assume the influence of the agents on delivering from the opportunity set U 
is defined by the weights  
Wn for Xn 
Wc for Xc 
Ww for Yw 
Wu for Yu 
Then  
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Table 8 
Pay off Matrix; Command over Set 'U' 
  Yw Yu  
Xc A: Wc ∩ Ww C: Wc ∩ Wu Wc 
Xn B: Wn ∩ Ww D: Wn ∩ Wu Wn 
  Ww Wu U 
 
If set A prevails in the system then the system would be most stable and contrary 
to that for D it would be most unstable, other options are in between these limits and 
becomes a questions of relative weights in the opportunity set. Expected results of the 
analysis enable us to give policy recommendation to increase convergence of the system 
by increasing number of agents of Xc and Yw and the system of government removing 
randomness of the system.  
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